

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

POLLUTION REPORT

DATE: July 23, 1986

Region II

Response and Prevention Branch
Edison, New Jersey 08837

201-321-6656 Office (FTS 340-6656)
201-548-8730 24-Hour Emergency (Also FTS)

TO: Data Base Manager ✓
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TAT

POLREP NO.: One (1) and Final
INCIDENT NAME: SCP/Carlstadt, NJ
SITE/SPILL NO.: 909-86
POLLUTANT: Sludge with low flash point
CLASSIFICATION: Moderate
SOURCE: SCP operations in past
LOCATION: Carlstadt, NJ
AMOUNT: Approx. 2000 gal.
WATER BODY: None

1. SITUATION:

- A. EPA called by NJDEP representative that was on site at the time of the spill, 07/22/86 at 1130 hrs.
- B. EPA/TAT also was on site monitoring the responsible party removal ordered by ERR-SIC.
- C. Response and Prevention Branch made a response to the scene arriving at 1400 hrs.
- D. EPA responders found hazardous waste sludge characterized by flash point below 140° F on ground beyond the plastic tarp intended to control spills during operations. Approximately 2000 gal. and a 600 square foot area was involved.

2. ACTION TAKEN:

- A. Responsible party's contractor, Chemical Waste Management, used the vacuum truck, from which the sludge had been accidentally spilled, to pick up the sludge from the top of the ground and from the plastic tarp.

- B. Chemical Waste Management arranged for immediate clean-up of the contaminated soil by ordering power equipment to dig up the wet soil.
- C. EPA and NJDEP personnel on site monitored area of the spill with HNU vapor analyzer and explosimeter. Very low vapor levels were indicated in the immediate area. Odor levels were only moderately elevated over background.
- D. By the morning following the spill the recovered soil that had been contaminated by contents from tank T-4 was on a new plastic tarp and covered with a second tarp. The junction between the two sheets was protected by an earthen berm.

3. MEASURES WHICH COULD AVOID RELEASES OF A SIMILAR NATURE:


- A. The accident was evidently due to lack of operator training on the special tank truck employed. The operator unintentionally activated hydraulic controls that open a door in the end of the tank.

4. FUTURE PLANS AND RECOMENDATIONS:

- A. The proper containerization and disposal of the recovered waste contaminated soil will be monitored by EPA/TAT.

FINAL POLREP X

SUBMITTED BY



Bob Harris, OSC
Response and Prevention
Branch

DATE RELEASED

7/30/86